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An Affair on Every Continent

An Affair on Every Continent:
French Reaction to the Foreign Press
during the Dreyfus Affair
David Murrell
On October 15, 1894, artillery captain Alfred Dreyfus
was summoned to the French Ministry of War in Paris. At the
time, the Jewish soldier, born in the northeastern French region
of Alsace, thought nothing of the matter, believing he was merely
due for his annual inspection. The only peculiarity was that he
was specifically ordered to wear civilian clothing, but this seemed
unimportant. Upon arriving at the ministry building, Lieutenant
Colonel Charles du Paty de Clam met Dreyfus and asked the artillery captain to compose a letter on his behalf, citing a sore finger.
Dreyfus obliged, still unaware that anything was amiss. It was only
after he had finished the letter, when du Paty de Clam rose and announced emphatically, “In the name of the law, I arrest you; you
are accused of the crime of high treason,”1 that Dreyfus realized
this was no ordinary inspection.
Such were the humble beginnings of what came to be
known as the Dreyfus affair, an international scandal that wracked
France, as well as the rest of the world, from 1894 until 1906.
Specifically, Dreyfus had been accused of passing on French army
secrets to the German military attaché in Paris, Maximilien von
Schwartzkoppen. As evidence, senior officials on the French General Staff cited a document which would come to be known as the
bordereau, an unsigned sheet of paper containing sensitive French
military information that had been picked up by a French spy in
Schwartzkoppen’s wastebasket at the German embassy. When du
Paty de Clam summoned Dreyfus on that mid-October morning,
his finger was not really injured. It was a trap, meant to prove that
Dreyfus’s hand had written the incriminating document. The evi44
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dence was good enough for du Paty de Clam, for he immediately
ordered Dreyfus’s incarceration. Dreyfus was then convicted by
a closed-door military tribunal in December 1894 and sent to
Devil’s Island, a penal colony off the coast of French Guiana,
South America, notorious for its brutal conditions. With Dreyfus
shipped halfway across the world and locked in a stone cabin
measuring four square meters,2 the story of a traitorous Jewish
officer ought to have ended once and for all.
Without the mass press that was burgeoning throughout
Europe and, indeed, much of the world, this might very well
have been the case. The turn of the twentieth century, however,
brought with it a newly powerful actor: the modern newspaper.

Illustration of Alfred Dreyfus’s degradation ceremony
at the École Militaire
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In France, the foundations for a literate, engaged citizenry were
laid decades earlier with the adoption of the 1833 Loi Guizot,
which established primary schools throughout the country and
created a new base of readers in addition to the urban dwellers
and educated classes.3 Not only were these new segments of society now capable of reading, but they also had access to a novel
brand of popular press which, according to historian Christophe
Charle, “abandoned the political function that dominated the
press, instead choosing to distract and move the new readers,
leading to the development of so-called tabloids.”4 With its diverse cast of characters, the Dreyfus affair served as fantastic
tabloid fodder throughout Europe. Whether one was a “Dreyfusard” supporting the artillery captain, or an “anti-Dreyfusard” in
favor of the guilty verdict, there was no shortage of heroes and
villains to support.
The case itself had an inherently dramatic quality to it,
for it soon became evident that a number of the documents used
to convict Dreyfus in his first court-martial were forgeries created by members of the French military. Colonel Georges Picquart, one of Dreyfus’s earliest defenders in the military, also
realized that the leaks to Schwartzkoppen had continued even
after Dreyfus’s arrest, which led him to discover the real traitor,
a soldier by the name of Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy. While the
French military had no desire to reopen the Dreyfus case, even
wrongly clearing Esterhazy of any wrongdoing in a court-martial, the press was now reporting on the various developments in
the nascent affair with great zeal. This was in large part thanks
to an article from a French newspaper, Georges Clemenceau’s
L’Aurore, which helped spark serious international interest in the
Dreyfus affair. That article was “J’accuse…!,” celebrated French
novelist Émile Zola’s seminal open letter to French President Félix Fauré, published January 13, 1898. In “J’accuse,” Zola alleged
that a massive conspiracy was being propagated by the French
government and military to cover up Dreyfus’s innocence. In
the aftermath of the article’s publication, it became clear that the
46
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French government would not succeed in burying the Dreyfus
case, for Zola had managed to transform it into a bona fide international scandal. Indeed, from 1898 onward, Zola’s open letter
polarized individual citizens within France, while also galvanizing support for Dreyfus throughout the world in the pages of
the foreign press.
There would be many developments and revelations
between January 1898 and August 1899, the month Dreyfus
was recalled from Devil’s Island for a second military tribunal
in Rennes, France. But in some ways, Zola’s “J’accuse,” imposing such pressure upon the French government, fast-tracked
the Dreyfus case straight to Rennes. Indeed, by this point, the
Dreyfus affair had gripped France, as well as the rest of Europe. In one Belgian town, the entire community put on a parade
in advance of the Rennes court-martial, complete with citizens
dressed up as French officers and lawyers.5 It is conceivable that
these Belgian townsfolk were not well-versed in the political and
legal intricacies of the Dreyfus affair. But to them, these details
did not matter. They were drawn to the characters and the theatrics of it all, as if the affair itself were a real-life play. This was
the legacy of the popular press, which highlighted narrative and
drama over the more burdensome legal and political details.
If the French government was concerned about the political and social ramifications of an incendiary article like Zola’s,
then it was equally troubled by the new international tenor of
the affair. Admittedly, these fears proved to be quite rational.
On the day of Dreyfus’s reconviction at Rennes, demonstrations
broke out in favor of the ex-captain around the world. From
Egypt to Australia, and virtually everywhere in between, the
message was the same: people were indignant that Dreyfus had
been reconvicted, particularly given the revelations that many of
the documents used to convict him had been fraudulent.6 The
French consul in Melbourne, Australia, reported that the situation “could not be worse.”7 In Belgium, the press was described
as having a “rare violence.”8 Tens of thousands demonstrated
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in favor of Dreyfus at Hyde Park in London, England.9 And in
Buenos Aires, Argentina, a group of socialists signed a petition
condemning the verdict, with the hope that their message could
be transmitted to Dreyfus’s lawyer, Fernand Labori.10
In 1899, nearly five years after Dreyfus’s original conviction, the case inspired more controversy than ever before. It was
ultimately the risk of a continued media fiasco that led French
President Émile Loubet to offer Dreyfus a pardon, which the
artillery captain accepted on September 19, 1899. This, however, did not bring about a calm denouement to the affair. Indeed, the Dreyfus affair was like a Hydra: when one controversy

Émile Zola’s “J’accuse…!”
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was settled, two more appeared in its place. Eventually, in 1904,
Dreyfus’s lawyer submitted a request on behalf of his client for
a new appeal. After a slow march through the French courts,
the Supreme Court of Appeal announced on July 12, 1906, that
Alfred Dreyfus was innocent. The French Senate passed a bill to
promote Dreyfus to the rank of major within the army. The following decade, Dreyfus would serve alongside his countrymen as
an artillery officer in the First World War.
The foreign press played an instrumental role during the
affair, familiarizing individuals across borders and continents
with the plight of Dreyfus. These people then mobilized around
the world, pressuring the French government to amend the verdict. Newspapers worldwide, some utilizing news agencies such
as Reuters and others hiring their own foreign correspondents,
reported detailed updates on the affair on a daily basis. The extent of the spread of information was impressive, even by today’s standards. In 1898, for instance, the London Times republished a letter, originally sent to a newspaper in Vienna, Austria,
which had been written by an American woman living in a small
Finnish town.11 The woman, describing the conditions in her village, reported, “People here are so frightfully interested in [the
affair]. Even the peasants in quite out of the way places spoke
about it to my husband on his last journey. The general opinion
in this country is that Dreyfus is innocent.”12
This sort of article, which did not condemn the French
state or military, was relatively benign as far as the French government was concerned. But there were still many other stories
written by the foreign press that directly attacked the French
government’s treatment of Dreyfus and, at least implicitly and
occasionally explicitly, encouraged its readers to protest against
France. Such demonstrations and discourse inevitably hurt
France’s reputation as a bastion of justice and equality, a position
it had enjoyed since the French Revolution in 1789. This change
in perception was a central concern of the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, which kept detailed reports from its consuls and
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ambassadors abroad pertaining to the activities of the foreign
press.
Of much greater concern to the ministry, however, was
the publication of numerous articles, particularly in neighboring Britain, which subsequently trickled into France and served
to reignite the debate surrounding Dreyfus. This phenomenon
was especially prevalent during the years between Dreyfus’s first
conviction in 1894 and the publication of “J’accuse” in 1898,
a period when the affair was by no means entrenched as an international scandal. Most famously, in 1896, Mathieu Dreyfus,
the brother of Alfred, convinced the British Daily Chronicle to
publish a false story proclaiming that his brother had escaped
from Devil’s Island.13 Mathieu hoped this would keep his brother’s name in the press and provide a reminder that the Dreyfus
affair had not yet concluded. Ultimately, Mathieu’s gamble paid
dividends as a number of British papers picked up the story,
prompting the French press to follow suit and thus keeping the
Dreyfus scandal in the public consciousness in France.
Given this volatile atmosphere, it should come as no surprise that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to keep
close tabs on the foreign media in order to control any discourse
pertaining to Dreyfus. This desire to control information abroad
led the French government to pursue attempts at censorship
more broadly than it ever did with its own domestic press. Although the French certainly spied on their own newspapers and
reporters, the government never moved to prevent the publication of a domestic news story. This was due to the Press Law of
1881, which effectively guaranteed newspapers the freedom to
print whatever they pleased. The French treatment of the foreign press, on the other hand, was a different story, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly attempted to intervene through
diplomatic channels in order to limit the publication of damning
materials against the French state. Unfortunately for the French
government, many of the foreign countries that covered the affair most aggressively (particularly Belgium, Britain, Germany,
50

David Murrell

An Affair on Every Continent

and Switzerland) either had their own liberalized press laws or
had no incentive to restrict the publication of articles that were
hostile to France. For these reasons, the French focused their
censorship efforts, particularly within Europe, on theater productions, which were not yet granted similar freedoms from government censors. Even on the few occasions when France did
move to influence the press outside of Europe, the country’s
efforts were generally unsuccessful.
***
Relative to the rest of the world, the European press received the vast majority of attention from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. This was expected, for Europeans were much closer to
France geographically and thus more familiar with the country’s
history and culture. Naturally, this geographic proximity enabled
the European press to locate more sources and invest more in
breaking stories over the course of the entire affair, as opposed
to covering only crucial events such as the Rennes court-martial.
The shared cultural and historical understanding among Europeans was a primary reason the French government was so
concerned with European press coverage. Indeed, much of the
affair was couched in terms that were intra-European in nature,
making it relevant to the entire continent. When the coverage
was critical of France, as it almost always was, this constituted a
political threat. For instance, after the British Daily Mail coined
the term in September 1899, much of the European press began
referring to the Dreyfus affair as France’s “moral Sedan,” connecting the scandal to France’s humiliating military defeat at the
Battle of Sedan in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Moreover, the European press had an incentive to market the affair in
a way that appealed to Europeans on a broader level. In doing
so, the press created a continent-wide scandal, involving various
players from France, Germany, and Italy alike. It became impossible for Europeans not to link the infiltration of Maximilien von
Penn History Review

51

An Affair on Every Continent

Schwartzkoppen, the German spy to whom Dreyfus allegedly
sold military secrets, to the French military and its involvement
in the Franco-Prussian War. Similarly, the Dreyfusard European
press could not help but frame the ex-captain’s convictions as a
repudiation of the gains of the French Revolution. In this regard, Europe was better equipped to cover the affair with vitriol
and acumen than any other part of the world.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs devoted immense resources to tracking the activities of this international press. The
department’s minister, Gabriel Hanotaux, received daily updates
from his consular and ambassadorial staff on the day’s foreign
news. These dispatches took many different forms: press clippings of specific articles, hand-written translations, and detailed
syntheses describing the coverage of numerous papers. In the
early days of the affair, it was not a foregone conclusion that the
foreign press would become obsessed with covering the case of
Alfred Dreyfus. For instance, on November 6, 1897, the French
ambassador to Germany wrote to Hanotaux, “the Affair in question offers no direct interest for the German government.”14 The
sentiment was echoed by the German press, and one German
newspaper, La Gazette de la Croix, mentioned, “This whole question is for France an internal affair, of which we in Germany do
not need to exaggerate the significance.”15
This detachment disappeared in a matter of weeks, following allegations in the French press that the German kaiser
himself dealt with Dreyfus and coordinated his espionage. Such
an assertion transformed the Dreyfus affair in the eyes of the
German populace from an entirely French scandal into a calumny that attacked the honor and reputation of Germany. In other
words, the affair became something of a geopolitical conflict. As
the French ambassador to Germany later described, “As a result
of all this, the German newspapers have modified their original
attitude and no longer publish exclusively news articles about the
affair.”16 Indeed, La Gazette de la Croix, which had downplayed
the affair’s significance weeks earlier, now termed it France’s
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“military Panama,” referring to the bribery scandal over the Panama Canal that walloped the French government in 1892. If this
anti-French sentiment was only burgeoning in Germany by the
end of November, it no doubt crystallized the following month.
On December 12, 1897, Henri de Rochefort published an even
more accusatory article in his popular newspaper L’Intransigeant,
further implicating German Kaiser Wilhelm II.17
This budding conflict with Germany was certainly troubling for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The French
ambassador to Germany continued to provide numerous updates on the “biased and Francophobic” writings in German
newspapers, such as those by the Paris correspondent of the Berliner Tageblatt.18 Germany was expected to cover the basic facts of
the affair, but this transition to aggressive anti-French opinion
pieces did not bode well for Franco-German relations. Indeed,
only two decades earlier, France had lost the mineral-rich territory of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany. The relationship between
the two European powers, therefore, was already tense. And for
a country that wished to appear strong in the aftermath of such
a devastating military defeat, the Dreyfus affair seemed to do
just the opposite for France, reflecting the image of a nation in
decline for all to see. In the context of Franco-German relations,
these small changes in public perception had tangible diplomatic
consequences.
Although no British diplomats were implicated in the
Dreyfus affair, much of the British press coverage has been understood by historians in similar geopolitical terms. As historian
Ricky Lee Sherrod argues, British interest in the affair stemmed
in part from fear over the prospect of a diminishing role of liberalism—particularly as it pertained to enlightened notions of
justice, democracy, and laissez-faire economics—in the coming twentieth century. The recently unified German Kaiserreich
seemed to demonstrate that a state could achieve its desired
ends through means that were decidedly illiberal, and the Dreyfus affair signaled that perhaps France was journeying down a
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similar path. Thus, as Sherrod writes, British reportage of the
affair reflected “a subliminal sense of national insecurity,” which
highlighted “an intense concern about the future of liberalism
and the declining popularity of liberal values in both Britain and
Europe.”19 As one magazine in Edinburgh noted, “If what is
now springing up rankly in France is germinating throughout the
world, then the beginning of a new century may be a rude one, a
terrible shaking, the end of which no human foresight can predict.”20 But if the British media were concerned about the future
of European liberalism, then the Dreyfus affair offered a rare
opportunity for Britain to assume the mantle as the “true world
leader and principal promoter of civilization and progressive
ways. The Affair demonstrated the fragility of French claims in
these respects.”21 This widespread sense of disappointment with
the apparent French descent into injustice and illiberalism was
not only felt across the English Channel. In 1898, the French
consul in Antwerp, Belgium, recorded a conversation in which
a local dignitary in the Masonic Lodge said, “If a war broke out
between France and Germany, all of the people would be happy
to hear of the defeat of the [French] ‘Grand Nation,’ which has
abdicated the ideas of justice and humanity of which she has
been the guardian since 1789.”22
Historian Ronald K. Huch identifies a British press that
was quite brazen in its geopolitical motivations for covering the
Dreyfus affair. Huch notes that there were protests throughout
Britain after Dreyfus’s second conviction at Rennes, but the moment Dreyfus was pardoned, the country seemed to lose any
sense of outrage regarding the affair. Thus, while a small number
of British citizens continued their noble fight and claimed that
a pardon was still unjust, most of the population felt as though
their task had been completed. Huch argues that this reaction
was no surprise, writing, “In England, the reaction to the Rennes
trial had always been more anti-French than pro-Dreyfus.”23 In
other words, the British had used the affair as a means of criticizing the French, stoking the centuries-old rivalry between the two
54
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countries. The moment France realized the folly of its ways and
pardoned Dreyfus, however, the British no longer had anything
to gain from attacking the French. Put simply, the fate of Dreyfus himself was irrelevant.
The aforementioned “J’accuse” was unquestionably the
spark that ignited much of the rhetoric surrounding the Dreyfus
affair around the globe. This rhetoric had tangible consequences
for French citizens living abroad. Indeed, in one February 1898
report sent to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Rotterdam consul in the Netherlands warned that “business with our
country is suffering from the current crisis. A certain number of
travelling French commerce agents have been recently recalled
by their firms because they have not been able to conduct any
business.”24 Reports such as this one solidified the belief within
the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the spread of antiFrench commentary across Europe had to be halted.
In Amsterdam, the French consul general reported that
many of Zola’s pamphlets had been translated into Dutch and
were now appearing in the windows of libraries across the city.25
Equally concerning to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the fact
that two pro-Dreyfus French newspapers, Le Siècle and L’Aurore,
were beginning to emerge on the shelves of small boutiques in
the Netherlands. The Amsterdam consul concluded that, since
these newspapers were not being sold in the official kiosks that
had a monopoly on the sale of foreign newspapers, they must
have been coming directly from Paris as a propaganda tool to
sow anti-French discord.26 Hanotaux found this development so
troubling that he forwarded the consul general’s message to his
superior, Prime Minister Jules Méline, and to his colleague in
the French cabinet, Minister of War Jean-Baptiste Billot. The
subtext in Hanotaux’s action is clear: the French government
may not have been able to censor Le Siècle or L’Aurore within its
own borders, but it certainly could attempt to prevent the illegal
smuggling of these Dreyfusard papers throughout Europe.
In attempting to control the foreign press’s access to
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French newspapers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reached out
to diplomats in neighboring countries. Only three days after Hanotaux received the news from his consul in Amsterdam, the
Ministry of the Interior sent him a separate message, asking Hanotaux to telegraph his German counterpart to see if L’Aurore
was sold there too.27 The French suspected that the newspaper
had made its way to Germany either through Belgium or the
Netherlands. Still, there is no evidence that the French government solicited the Germans to ban the sale of L’Aurore. Rather,
it is likely that the French were attempting to uncover the extent
of the smuggling of the newspapers, which they could then address internally by preventing them from ever leaving France illegally in the first place.

Members of the foreign press at the 1899 Rennes court-martial.
From Cinq semaines à Rennes, deux cents photographies de Gerschel
(Paris, France: F. Juven, 1900).
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***
Although the French government had to exercise some
degree of caution in controlling the press abroad, it felt much
more freedom in pursuing censorship of the arts, particularly the
theater. Even France itself, which had almost fully liberalized its
press laws in 1881, did not end censorship of the theater until
1906. This was in part because in the mid-nineteenth century, the
theater was considered even more influential than the press, as
it was one of the only ways through which the illiterate masses
could be exposed to political caricature and criticism of the ruling elites.28 However, as the century progressed and the masses
became more literate, the printed word surpassed plays as a more
powerful medium for influencing public opinion. Nevertheless,
the French government remained invested in censorship of theatrical productions sympathetic to Dreyfus. In particular, the
production of a play entitled “Dreyfus, or the Martyr of Devil’s
Island,” which quickly spread across Europe, preoccupied the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in France. In a letter dated January
17, 1898, French diplomats in Belgium first notified Minister Hanotaux about the play’s existence. Hanotaux and the French consul of Antwerp then worked together to find a way to outlaw the
performance altogether.29 Despite their efforts, the play’s popularity persisted and performances were carried out on a regular
basis in countries such as Italy and the Netherlands. Although
the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the cooperation of
the Italian government, was able to suppress a production of the
play being staged in San Remo, Italy, Dreyfus’s mass appeal rendered the play too difficult to suppress entirely. Indeed, not long
after receiving the positive news regarding San Remo, Hanotaux
confided to his consul in Amsterdam, “Are these performances
still going on? I can only regret that they haven’t been forbidden
like they were in The Hague.”30
French efforts to suppress theater productions brought
mixed results. On the one hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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did enforce the interdiction of some performances, particularly
in countries that maintained strong and beneficial diplomatic relations with France. Unlike major European powers such as Britain or Germany, smaller European states understood that there
was little to gain from consistently tarnishing France’s world
standing. As a result, these smaller countries were more sympathetic to France’s plight. As one Italian newspaper proclaimed,
“We love France and we wish her only the best: we hope she
stays in Europe as a leader of civilization rather than of barbarism.”31 These smaller European states were perhaps also wary
that a similar scandal could befall them one day in this new mass
media environment—they understood that by helping France
now during this time of need, they could rely upon the country
to return the favor at a later date.
Even for those European governments that did sympathize with France, enacting censorship necessitated a calculation
between the benefit of helping France versus the social cost of
enacting overly harsh suppression. In Amsterdam, for example,
the French were unable to convince Dutch diplomats to ban the
production of “Devil’s Island.” On January 26, 1898, the Amsterdam consul general broke the news to Hanotaux, writing, “A
prohibition would only create in the press an ardent polemic; the
legality and the opportunity would be contested…It would be a
redoubling of commotion, extra publicity from which only those
amateurs seeking scandal would benefit.”32 This must have come
as a disappointment to Minster Hanotaux, but the failure illustrates the complicated position occupied by the French Ministry
of Foreign Affairs when it came to the coverage of the Dreyfus
affair abroad. Although the press was much more of a threat to
public opinion given its ability to reach and affect more people, it
was nearly impossible to censor the scandal through diplomatic
channels due to the widespread freedom of the press laws in Europe. All that was left to censor, then, were the cheap and often
poorly attended “Boulevard theater” productions, such as “The
Captain Dreyfus,” which was staged in Hamburg, Germany, in
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February 1898. According to one Frenchman who attended the
play on behalf of the French consul, the spectacle was terrible.
“Poorly directed and without any artistic value,” he wrote, “there
were at least as many whistles as there was applause.”33

An advertisement for an American play based on the 1899 work Devil’s Island:
A Novel founded upon the famous Dreyfus case. Though there is no evidence the
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs ever sought to censor this particular
production, plays such as this one were often the targets of censorship efforts
led by the ministry.
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The French efforts to censor negative press in the arts
constitute an early form of so-called “cultural diplomacy.”34 This
was, of course, unlike the cultural diplomacy of the Cold War,
where cultural products were sent from the United States to
the Soviet Union, and vice versa, in an effort to establish some
degree of understanding between the two enemy powers. Instead, in the French context, cultural diplomacy was a strategy
implemented as a means of shaping the cultural realm of foreign countries in a way that was beneficial to French interests.
Such efforts at cultural diplomacy were not deployed solely by
the French. After the Rennes retrial and the decision to convict
Dreyfus, masses across Europe petitioned their respective governments to use cultural events to punish France. This took the
form of calls to boycott the 1900 World’s Fair, which was to
be held in Paris. These demands began as early as 1898, albeit
more quietly. One German newspaper first made the suggestion
after Zola was convicted for libel following the publication of
“J’accuse.”35 The French took these concerns seriously, for the
World’s Fair was anticipated to be not only an economic boon
for France, but also an opportunity to celebrate the country’s history and glory as one of the great states of Europe. Any boycott
would have been a serious blow both to finance and national
pride. In September 1899, the French consul at Hamburg alerted
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about a German news article that
suggested a boycott and also noted that “many very important
American businesses have made the decision to send nothing to
the Exposition if the situation does not improve, and the business world in England is set to follow this example as well.”36 As
Michael Burns notes in his historical study of the 1900 World’s
Fair and the Dreyfus pardon, the risk of losing the international
festival played a significant role in pressuring the French government to pardon Dreyfus following the Rennes verdict. As Burns
asserts,
[Prime Minister Pierre] Waldeck-Rousseau’s gov60
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ernment quickly realized that a pardon would
serve many purposes: it would eliminate the very
real possibility of the prisoner’s death while in
custody…The pardon would also serve to liberate Dreyfus without exonerating him (and thereby pacify many factions in France); and it would
salvage the 1900 Exposition by calming international protest.37
Although the threats to boycott never derived from individual governments, the international community nevertheless
exercised its own sort of pressure on France, much like France
did in its suppression of foreign theater productions through
cultural diplomacy.
***
Across the Atlantic Ocean, the French made little if any
effort to engage with or amend the portrayal of Alfred Dreyfus in the United States. Perhaps in that country, where freedom
of speech was so deeply ingrained in the fabric of society, the
French recognized that any requests for censorship would either
not be accepted or not be upheld. That is not to say, however,
that the French ignored American coverage of the Dreyfus affair altogether. And there was indeed tremendous coverage of
the scandal in the United States, which continued to crest leading up to and during the 1899 Rennes trial. As Egal Feldman,
a scholar of Jewish American history, records in his book The
Dreyfus Affair and the American Conscience, for a country “aspiring to play a meaningful, if not heroic, role in the world, it was
only natural that the attention of Americans would be attracted
to major political and social crises abroad.”38 Much of the affair was transmitted to the United States through British media
outlets—only a few newspapers based out of major cities in the
United States could afford their own foreign correspondents to
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travel to France and report on the unfolding events there—and
consequently, a significant portion of American coverage began
to reflect certain British idiosyncrasies and perspectives. Most
notably, this manifested into what Feldman terms an “AngloAmerican bond” in judicial procedures.39 A New York Times article from 1898 illustrates this tendency:
In France…there are no rules of evidence…
Witnesses have appeared before the judges and
have spoken their minds freely. They have not
presented evidence. They have given their own
opinions. They have expressed the opinions of
others. They have repeated conversations that
they have heard at second or third hand. All this
is called testimony in Europe.40
Much of this coverage can be interpreted as American self-congratulation. The not-so-subtle subtext in articles such as these
was that Dreyfus’s conviction never could have occurred in a
more civilized or democratic nation such as the United States,
where judicial procedures and norms were much more rational.
In this regard, American press coverage hardly differed from the
self-aggrandizement that historian Ricky Lee Sherrod detected
in his study of the British press.
On the other hand, the French judiciary undeniably tolerated a great deal of testimony that would have been impermissible in the United States. During the Rennes court-martial, for
instance, former French Minister of War Auguste Mercier testified that German and British bankers had donated over thirtyfive million francs to mysterious forces—frequently referred to
in the anti-Semitic, anti-Dreyfusard press as the so-called “Jewish Syndicate”—who were working to exonerate Dreyfus.41 The
French newspapers were left to rebut this claim, with one article
in Le Figaro commenting, “Nothing is more unjust, nothing more
slanderous, monstrous, however, than that accusation of Gen62
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eral Mercier…It is an attempt to dishonor all those who fight for
the triumph of the truth.”42 Thus, in France, newspapers played
the role of quasi-arbiter, condemning false testimony when the
judicial structure failed to do so. Still, to an American public unfamiliar with the intricacies of French legal customs, testimony
like Mercier’s was laughable and undermined justice.
The French were well aware of the growing power of
the United States, and this sometimes manifested itself as unreasonable paranoia about the influence of the American press. The
most pronounced instance of such fears transpired in December
1897, when Minister Hanotaux sent a letter to the New York
consul marked “very confidential,” inquiring into an alleged plot
orchestrated by the New York newspaper the World to free Dreyfus from Devil’s Island:
An individual who calls himself Antoine de Bastillac, and who has collaborated at the World in
New York, recently passed through Paris, stating
that he had participated in a plot that was organized a few months ago in the United States by
the Israelite director of the newspaper to remove
Dreyfus; he assures that the project will soon be
restarted and that an expedition will be organized
in Louisiana to this end, under the pretext of a
shipment of arms to Cuba. Do your best to provide me information on Bastillac and on what he
alleges. If need be, consult with your colleague in
New Orleans.43
That the French believed such a complex scheme to be plausible
speaks volumes about their perception of the American press.
Indeed, the French were so concerned about the possibility of
such a plot that they even contacted Spain to request that the
Spanish provide any intelligence they might have procured pertaining to the alleged conspiracy. Such a plan never materialized
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and was, of course, no more than an elaborate fiction. Yet the
seriousness with which the French government processed and
reacted to this warning reveals a deep-seated fear of the power
of the American press.
If French government officials feared American newspaper influence, they also often expressed disdain for the negative
coverage that so frequently emanated from the United States.
The reports sent from the Chicago consul to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Rennes trial of 1899 were particularly indicative of this French sentiment, which contained a
powerful mix of wounded pride and betrayal. In these letters, the
Chicago consul compiled an impressive list of grievances against
the United States. From criticism of the newspaper coverage
itself, to jealousy over the country’s privileged position in the
world, to dissatisfaction with the hypocrisy of American society
as a whole, these missives expressed in impassioned language the
frustration felt by a proud Frenchman and diplomat serving his
country in hostile isolation.
In one of the consul’s earliest letters to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, dated August 24, 1899, the diplomat noted with
contempt that every single newspaper in Chicago was supporting Dreyfus. This was compounded by the fact that, curiously,
many pro-Dreyfus Frenchmen had been contributing articles to
the American press, which had infused the local coverage with
a heretofore unseen tenacity and proximity to the story. As the
consul in Chicago observed, “Numerous French writers such
as Bernard Lazare, Joseph Reinach, Marcel Prévost, and Clemenceau contribute regularly to this extraordinary service of the
American press, which we can say has been unanimously favorable to the condemned of 1894.”44 He later continued, “All good
Frenchmen abroad cannot rid themselves of an incommensurate
sadness in the presence of exaggerated interference of the foreign press in a family affair.”45 Implied in these musings of the
consul was the belief that the foreign press took an interest in the
Dreyfus affair not for noble reasons of justice, but instead due to
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a voyeuristic fascination with watching and analyzing what he believed to be a private “family affair.” Thus, it must have been disheartening for the diplomat to hear from an American journalist
that “It is good style now to run down France; it makes money;
it shows to France that there is something else than herself and
behind her in the world.”46
Arguably the most fascinating aspects of these letters
from the consul in Chicago were his own interpretations of
American society near the turn of the twentieth century and the
visible contradictions he discerned between the holier-than-thou
tone expressed in American newspapers versus the actual news
unfolding within the borders of the United States. Of particular
interest was an anecdote reported by the consul in 1899, when a
Jewish cadet was forced to leave the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York, following repeated anti-Semitic
treatment from his classmates. On this issue, the consul in Chicago noted that the American press remained silent. “It is, anyhow,
the third incident of this sort that has occurred in recent years…
We are getting used to being treated in the manner in which
we treat China…At home, we cover up all things,” he mused,
mimicking the American thought process, “but when we need
to provide something exciting to our readers, we demand light,
always more light on the affairs of France.”47 If American antiSemitism and hypocrisy were not already disgraceful enough,
the consul also hurled accusations at the Americans for being
fortunate geographically, yet ungrateful to the French, who had
helped secure American independence over a century earlier:
If they had, to the west, a powerful Mexico possessing a fleet twice their size, and wealth, and an
incommensurable means of attacking them, the
press of this country would better understand
the indignity of its current behavior against our
nation, which has poured its blood and given its
gold, even when it was weak and fighting almost
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without hope for its independence from which it
has grown ever since.48
The link between the foreign press and diplomacy was
clear to the Chicago consul. In his view, the press was a tool with
which geopolitical games could be conducted. This was by no
means incorrect, for as has been noted earlier, the British press
printed false stories about Dreyfus’s escape from Devil’s Island
with the hopes that this would reignite the affair. Indeed, the
British motivation for doing so was, as Ronald Huch contended,
to help encourage anti-French sentiment and in turn promote
the superiority of the British.49 The French diplomat in Chicago
perceived many similarities in American press coverage, speculating that the country’s pro-Dreyfus sentiments stemmed from,
above all, a desire for Anglo-American friendship: “I am convinced that the American press would not be so violent against
us, if behind its movements existed the desire…to benefit their
new British friends.”50 This is precisely what Egal Feldman speculates, referring to the Anglo-American friendship as “a rediscovery of a common Anglo-Saxon heritage, a ‘unique partnership’; proposals were even made for an alliance or reunion of the
English-speaking people.”51 But the consul in Chicago was not
only concerned with the burgeoning Anglo-American friendship. In a letter sent on September 10, 1899, the French diplomat
also reported that Kaiser Wilhelm II recently sent a German flag
to Chicago and remarked to an American that “a war between
Germany and the United States would be impossible.”52 For the
French, witnessing this condemnation from both Britain and
Germany must have been a gravely concerning diplomatic development. Perhaps most frustrating of all was the fact that France
was powerless to control the American press. With regards to
the United States, therefore, France found itself in a subservient
position, only able to express its displeasure in private dispatches
sent back to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris.
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***
Beyond Europe and the United States, France attempted
to control the foreign discourse surrounding the Dreyfus affair
with greater latitude, particularly in South America and India. No
longer burdened by strictly enforced liberal freedoms granted to
the press, the French could refocus their attention to influencing the printed word, which they never dared to do in Europe
or the United States. Indeed, on September 19, 1897, Minister
Hanotaux sent a telegram to the French consul in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil. “I understand that certain Brazilian newspapers are covering the Dreyfus Affair in order to spread negative press about
the government of the Republic,” the minister said, “I ask you
to keep watch over this campaign, and if necessary, refute the
noise put into circulation.”53 The order coming from the French
Ministry of Foreign Affairs here was somewhat ambiguous—
perhaps Hanotaux was using a euphemism to advocate for direct attempts at censorship of the Brazilian newspapers. Even
if Hanotaux only meant for his consul in Rio to make a public
denunciation of the Brazilian press, this still demonstrated a degree of direct intervention into another country’s foreign affairs
that France did not even attempt to employ in Europe.
France still met some opposition in its quest to control
the foreign press outside of Europe. Perhaps the most glaring
failure came in British-controlled India, following a particularly
incendiary sermon given by the bishop of Calcutta in September 1899. The speech, which was printed in its entirety in the
local newspaper The Englishman, attacked the moral fiber of the
French state for allowing the Dreyfus affair to transpire in the
first place, despite the recent pardon of the artillery captain. The
bishop began by lamenting the entire ordeal: “What has become
then of those high principles of liberty, equality, and brotherhood of which France has been held to be the self-constituted
exponent? What final interest can a nation possess save in truth
and justice and equity?”54 Next, he issued an attack on France,
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denouncing the French people with a flourish:
There are conditions of a comity among nations
as among individuals. We do not endow a man
with our confidence if he has proved guilty of
some flagrant crime; at least until he has repented of it. Nor can we stand upon friendly terms
with a nation of men which has violated the elementary laws of human truth and justice.55
Despite this disappointment in the French regime though, the
bishop’s sermon concluded on an optimistic note:
Let us pray then that France, that great and gallant nation, may know ere it be too late “the
things which belong unto her peace.” Let us pray
that she may cast off the bondage of that military
spirit which idolizes and sanctifies mere force.
Let us pray that she may turn her back upon the
unhappy policy which has too often in public
life ignored or dishonoured the sacred name of
God. Let us pray that in her national history she
may recognize and realise yet again the eternal
principles of truth and justice and equity.56
Unsurprisingly, the French found this sermon to be
harsh and unacceptable, going so far as to lodge an official complaint with the British colonial government.57 Citing a number of
different passages from the sermon, including one in which the
bishop advocated a boycott of the 1900 World’s Fair, the French
consul general in Calcutta claimed that the sermon was “injurious” and “an act of hostility against France.” Three weeks later,
the French government received a response from the colonial
government, which refused to apologize for the bishop’s behavior:
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The government of India can accept no responsibility for statements on matters of current interest that may be uttered from the pulpit either
by the metropolitan or by any Bishop or minister of religion in India. Such a responsibility is
not, so far as the government of India are aware,
assumed by the civil power in any country; and
it would appear to be fatal to that freedom of
thought and speech with which the pulpit among
all civilized peoples is, by virtues of its moral and
spiritual authority, endowed.58
This controversy helps reveal a crucial element of the
French response to the foreign press: the French government
was concerned not only with newspaper coverage pertaining to
the Dreyfus affair, but also with the spread of information pertaining to Dreyfus more generally, whether it be a sermon or a
theater production. Nor did these goals seem to have any sort
of geographic limits—indeed even India, which was neither a
French colony nor close to the European continent, was not exempt from receiving the attention of the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
***
That the French government invested so many resources
in the monitoring of the foreign press served as a tacit acknowledgement that the foreign press was among the primary engines
driving the scandal of the Dreyfus affair. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a rather simple strategy when it came to controlling coverage of the affair: limit any discourse, positive or negative, pertaining to Alfred Dreyfus. The hope was that by limiting
any kind of knowledge, foreign populations would eventually
lose interest in the drama of the affair. Given the links between
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foreign and French publications, this strategy might have served
as a means of minimizing French interest in the affair as well.
As a result, within Europe the French government
looked to control those elements of the press that it could manipulate with ease. This frequently meant wielding France’s close
diplomatic ties to its neighbors to engage in a sort of “cultural
diplomacy,” by which France could convince other countries to
suppress certain theater productions about Dreyfus. In this cultural realm, however, France experienced limited victories. The
theater had been the primary means of disseminating information to the masses in the mid-nineteenth century, but by the turn
of the twentieth century, the masses of Europe began to receive
much of their information from the press. And when France
turned its sights to this newly influential European press, other
states’ liberal press laws severely limited the country’s ability to
restrict the growing discourse of the Dreyfus affair.
Meanwhile, in the United States, the French experienced
no successes of any sort. The American press viewed the Dreyfus affair as a means of solidifying its friendship with Britain
and felt especially secure in knowing that the French could not
censor them in any way. The only arena in which the French government could attempt to control both the press and the cultural
sphere, therefore, was outside of the United States and Europe.
Even in these cases, however, the French experienced opposition. In a humiliating display of its own weakness, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not even manage to quell the antiFrench rhetoric of an anonymous preacher in the British imperial colony of India. This incident served to demonstrate both
the incredible spread of information about Dreyfus’s plight, as
well as the inability of France to control foreign engagement
with the scandal.
Confronted by a new era in which the press acted as the
engine of knowledge and scandal in the world, the French were
presented with a Sisyphean endeavor when it came to limiting
the scope of the Dreyfus affair. These forces would only con70
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tinue to swell in the coming twentieth century, as newspapers
continued to exert a massive influence on society. Indeed, in the
years leading up to the First World War, the German government
also began to closely monitor the press as a means of gauging
public opinion. It too viewed the press as a device with which it
could track and potentially influence the public.59 The Germans
would soon find, as the French had before, that their patriotic
press was ultimately impossible to control. The British would
also come to learn this lesson, for in 1909, the famous “We
want eight and won’t wait!” slogan propagated by the patriotic
press and naval armament interest groups compelled the Liberal
government to double its annual dreadnought production from
four to eight ships.60 These were the same underlying forces that
gripped France during the affair. The Dreyfus affair was thus a
preview of the powerful mass media and domestic pressures that
would come to characterize twentieth-century European states.
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